Submitted: April 10, 2014
On Defendant's Second Motion for Postconviction Relief.
Colleen K. Norris, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.
Robert D. Cammille, Cumberland, Maryland, pro se.
Richard R. Cooch, R.J.
This 3rd day of June 2014, upon consideration of Defendant's Second Motion for Postconviction Relief, it appears to the Court that:
1. Defendant Robert D. Cammille ("Defendant") pled guilty to Burglary Second Degree and was sentenced on February 21, 1996 to seven years Level 5, suspended after four years, for six months Level 4 Halfway House, followed by one year Level 3 and eighteen Months at Level 2. In the interim between his plea and sentencing, Defendant committed new offenses prosecuted in the Federal System. Defendant is currently in federal custody serving a 235 month sentence for those offenses. Defendant's first Motion for Postconviction Relief, based on ineffective assistance of counsel, was denied on November 21, 1997. Defendant was discharged as unimproved from his probation for the burglary offense and his case was closed May 3, 2000. The docket further reflects that financial obligations for this case were satisfied as of May 8, 2000.
2. Defendant filed his second Motion for Postconviction Relief on October 9, 2013. He asserts ineffective assistance of counsel and additional errors by both the State and the Court during his plea agreement damaged his "future case."
3. Superior Court Criminal Procedure Rule 61 for Postconviction Remedy governs "the procedure on an application by a person in custody or subject to future custody under a sentence of this court seeking to set aside a judgment of conviction…" "All courts in Delaware that have considered whether postconviction relief under Rule 61 is potentially available to a person who is not 'in custody or subject to future custody' for the challenged sentence have agreed that such relief under Rule 61 is not available." The Delaware Supreme Court has elaborated:
We have previously explained that a person loses standing to move for postconviction relief under Rule 61 where the defendant is not in custody or subject to future custody for the underlying offense or challenged sentence. The Superior Court has consistently applied the custody standard in summarily dismissing other postconviction motions. The Superior Court discharged Ruiz from probation on June 3, 1997, he is not subject to any future custody for these original charges, and thus lacks standing to seek Rule 61 relief. We affirm the denial of his motion for postconviction relief without reaching his substantive claims.
4. Before addressing the merits of this Motion for Postconviction Relief, the Court must address any procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i). Here, Defendant was discharged from probation as unimproved, his financial obligations satisfied, and his case closed over fourteen years ago. Therefore, he is no longer "in custody or subject to future custody" in a manner contemplated by Rule 61. As such, Defendant lacks standing under Rule 61 and is not entitled to seek postconviction relief. The Court need not reach the merits of Defendant's Motion.
Therefore, Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief is ...