The Council of Unit Owners of Windswept Condo. Ass'n
Ocean Atlantic Assocs., VII, LLC
Submitted: February 20, 2014
On November 20, 2013 the Court granted Defendant Robert Schumm's ("Schumm") Motion for Summary Judgment. On August 9, 2012 Plaintiff The Council of Unit Owners of Windswept Condominium Association ("Windswept") filed a breach of contract action and sought reimbursement for the costs incurred to repair Schumm's unit and the unit below. Windswept claimed Schumm's shower pan had cracked, causing water to seep into the floor of Schumm's unit and the unit below, resulting in extensive structural damage. However, the Court determined Windswept had failed to prove causation as to the extensive structural damage and granted summary judgment in Schumm's favor.
As the prevailing party, Schumm submitted an Affidavit in support of Attorney's Fees (the "Affidavit"). The Court found the Affidavit lacked specificity, and requested Schumm provide additional information in order for the Court to fully evaluate the reasonableness of the requested fees pursuant to General Motors Corp. v. Cox. The Court has received additional briefing from the parties, and the issue is ripe for a decision.
Schumm alleges that he is entitled to the award of fees and costs arising out of litigation that Windswept brought. Schumm requests fees be made payable to "Robert W. Schumm and Wetzel & Associates, P.A.", and not payable to his insurance carrier.
First, Schumm contends that the payment of his attorney's fees by his insurance carrier on his behalf is a collateral source and should not be considered by the Court in making its fee award. "The collateral source rule is predicated upon the theory that a tortfeasor has no interest in, and therefore no right to benefit from, monies received by the injured person from sources unconnected with the defendant." Put another way, Windswept has no right to any mitigation of damages because Schumm contracted for insurance and paid the insurance premiums.
Second, Schumm points to Superior Court Civil Rule 54(d) ("Rule 54(d)") and various statutory provisions, including 10 Del. C. §§ 5101 and 8906, to support his notion that fees should be awarded to him as the prevailing party in this matter.
Neither the rule nor statutes provide any exclusion for recovery of a prevailing party's costs if that party's costs have, in the first instance, been paid by the prevailing party's insurance carrier. Courts awarding costs to prevailing parties do not look behind the cost award to see who paid those costs. In reaching this conclusion, Schumm compares the case at hand to that of a defendant involved in an automobile accident case. There, the defendant is defended by their insurance carrier, yet as the prevailing party the defendant is awarded costs and testifying expert fees.
Lastly, Schumm relies on the Code of Regulations for Windswept Condominium, Article X, Section 1(c) (the "Code"). The Code provides ". . . the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover the costs of the proceedings, and such reasonable attorneys' fees as may be determined by the court." "According to the contract between Schumm and Windswept, Schumm is entitled to his attorney's fees, and the Court should not provide Windswept with what would ultimately result in a windfall."
In response, Windswept maintains the collateral source rule is traditionally a tort doctrine not a contract doctrine; and the matter before the Court is based solely on contract law. Therefore, the doctrine cannot be extended to apply to the matter at hand because, unlike tort damages, contract damages are simply designed to place the injured party in the same place he would have been had there been no injury or breach. The only potential injury would have been Schumm's defense costs; however, those costs were covered by his insurance carrier.
Furthermore, Schumm cannot rely on Rule 54(d) or 10 Del. C. §§ 5501 and 8906 for the proposition that he may recover attorney's fees and expert fees.Neither Rule 54(d) nor 10 Del. C. § 5501 allow the Court to award attorney's fees to the prevailing party; rather, such authorities allow the Court to award costs. "A court may not ordinarily order the payment of attorney's fees as costs to be paid by the losing party." Lastly, pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 8906 Schumm cannot recover expert fees because the experts in this case never testified at trial.
The Court decides the present issue based on the following two questions: (1) whether Schumm is entitled to the payment of attorney's fees and costs when such expenses were paid by Schumm's insurance carrier; and (2) whether Schumm is entitled to the ...