United States District Court, D. Delaware
MEMORANDUM ORDER 
LEONARD P. STARK, District Judge.
WHEREAS, on April 18, 2012, Magistrate Judge Mary Pat Thynge held a teleconference with counsel to address certain discovery issues involving assertions of attorney-client privilege and work product immunity relating to documents produced by third-party Acacia Research Corporation ("Acacia"), the parent of former plaintiff Safety Braking Corporation ("SBC"), in response to a subpoena in another case (see Transcript of April 18, 2012 hearing (D.I. 282 Ex. A and, hereinafter, "April 18th Tr." and/or "April 18, 2012 Order"); see also D.I. 268, 269, 271, 272, 273, 277, 278);
WHEREAS, Plaintiffs G&T Conveyor Co. ("G&T") and Magnetar Technologies Corp. ("Magnetar"), as well as CBLH, timely objected to Judge Thynge's April 18, 2012 Order ("First Objections") (D.I. 274);
WHEREAS, by their First Objections, Plaintiffs contended that Mr. Zelley's deposition should not go forward due to the risk of a waiver of attorney client privilege and attorney work product, that the Zelley memorandum and other assertedly privileged documents should be returned, and that Defendants should not be able to further use such documents (see id.; see also D.I. 296, 297, 298);
WHEREAS, Defendants responded to the First Objections, urging the affirmance of Judge Thynge's decision and requesting that the deposition of Mr. Zelley proceed (see D.I. 276; see also D.I. 303);
WHEREAS, Defendants thereafter filed a motion to compel the production of certain disputed documents and portions of documents subject to Plaintiffs claims of attorney-client privilege and work product protection, and therein requested that Plaintiffs' and CBLH's objections to such production be overruled (the "Motion to Compel") (D.I. 279; see also D.I. 280, 291, 303);
WHEREAS, Plaintiffs and CBLH objected to the Motion to Compel (D.I. 281, 283; see also D.I. 282, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 292, 293, 296, 297, 298), requesting that the Court deny the motion;
WHEREAS, on August 22, 2012, Judge Thynge issued a Memorandum Order granting in part and denying in part the Motion to Compel (see D.I. 312 at 37-40);
WHEREAS, Plaintiffs timely objected to the August 22, 2012 Memorandum Order ("Second Objections") (D.I. 315);
WHEREAS, by their Second Objections, Plaintiffs objected to that part of the ruling concerning the destruction of documents, and the resulting sanction imposed therein,  i.e., although Judge Thynge found no bad faith by Plaintiffs in connection with the destruction of certain documents, nonetheless she ordered that, as a sanction, some documents containing privileged attorney-client communications should be produced (see id. at 1, 4-5);
WHEREAS, Plaintiffs specifically contend Judge Thynge erred: (1) "in finding that Magnetar had control of any of the documents in question;" (2) "in finding that G&T had control over the documents sent by [BAE Automated Systems, Inc. ("BAE")] to BAE's Denver law firm in 1997 or 1998, years prior to G&T's purchase of some of BAE's assets;" (3) "in imposing a sanction even though there was no finding that anyone intended to suppress evidence;" (4) "in failing to consider that the defendants have not been prejudiced because they say the evidence available to them supports their view that a summary judgment of invalidity of the [U.S. Patent No. 5, 277, 125] is warranted;" and (5) "in ignoring unrebutted evidence that the document custodians did not destroy evidence believed to be relevant to litigation, and in fact gathered evidence relevant to this litigation" (id. at 9-10);
WHEREAS, Plaintiffs further assert that, even if Judge Thynge was correct, "the only relief warranted by the cases cited in the [August 22, 2012] Order would have been the production of litigation hold letters" (id. at 10);
WHEREAS, Defendants responded to Plaintiffs' Second Objections, urging the affirmance of the Magistrate Judge's rulings and contending that "there is abundant evidence to support Magistrate Thynge's finding of spoliation, " and that the "sanction imposed was neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law" (D.I. 321 at 2);
WHEREAS, "[p]ursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), non-dispositive pre-trial rulings made by Magistrate Judges on referred matters should only be set aside if clearly erroneous or contrary to law." Leader Techs., Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 719 F.Supp.2d 373, 375 (D. Del. 2010). A Magistrate Judge's finding is clearly erroneous if it "(1) is completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of credibility, or (2) bears no rational ...