Submitted: August 7, 2013
On Defendant's Motion to Suppress Searches – DENIED On Defendant's Motion to Suppress and Other Remedies-Subpoenaed Material – DENIED On Defendant's Motion for Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire – DENIED IN PART On Defendant's Motion for Relief from Prejudicial Joinder – DENIED On Defendant's Motion to Preclude the State from Seeking the Death Penalty Against a Severely Mentally Ill. Defendant – DENIED On Defendant's Motion to Suppress Statements – GRANTED IN PART On Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert Opinion Testimony – DENIED.
Steven D. Wood, Esquire; John W. Downs, Esquire, Department of Justice,
Kevin J. O'Connell, Esquire; Robert M. Goff, Esquire; Ross Flockerzie, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender
William C. Carpenter, Jr. Judge.
Before this Court are the following motions filed by Defendant David A. Salasky, Jr. ("Salasky"): 1) Motion to Suppress Searches; 2) Motion to Suppress and Other Remedies-Subpoenaed Material; 3) Motion for Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire; 4) Motion for Relief from Prejudicial Joinder; 5) Motion to Preclude the State from Seeking the Death Penalty Against a Severely Mentally Ill. Defendant; 6) Motion to Suppress Statements; 7) Motion in Limine to Exclude Expert Opinion Testimony; and 8) Motion in Limine for Access to Criminal Histories of Potential Jurors. This is the Court's decisions on these motions.
In the early morning hours of September 16, 2011, Sergeant Joseph Szczerba ("Szczerba"), an on duty and in uniform officer of the New Castle County Police Department ("NCCPD"), responded to 911 reports of a theft from a motor vehicle and an altercation that occurred in the Penn Acres community in New Castle, Delaware. Specifically, the 911 reports stated that an individual had broken into a motor vehicle and that, after being confronted, the perpetrator used a knife to cut the owner of that vehicle. The subsequent investigation revealed that the perpetrator was Salasky and that he had engaged in a string of car burglaries in the late evening hours of September 15, 2011. Further, it was determined that stolen from one of the vehicles was a 5-inch, fixed blade knife which Salasky used to cut Kevin Byrd ("Byrd"), the owner of one of the vehicles, and also later used to stab Szczerba.
After initially stealing the knife, Salasky continued to the area of Finney Road in Penn Acres where he then attempted to enter a Cadillac sedan owned by Byrd. However, when Byrd observed Salasky in his car, Byrd went outside to confront him. Upon seeing Byrd, Salasky ran and a chase ensued, leading to the backyard of another home on Finney Road. In an effort to escape Byrd, Salasky unsuccessfully attempted to climb a fence but after he was unable to do so, he threatened to stab Byrd and used the knife to slash at him. Although Byrd suffered a minor wound, he was able to restrain Salasky until he determined that Salasky had not stolen anything from his car and released him. Salasky fled leaving behind a cell phone, which was later determined to belong to Salasky's girlfriend, Aleigha Hart ("Hart"). Based upon his interaction with Salasky, Byrd stated to the police that he believed Salasky was under the influence of methamphetamines during their altercation.
Along with several other NCCPD officers, Szczerba responded to the Finney Road area in Penn Acres. Shortly after responding, Szczerba observed an individual matching the description of the suspect in the 300 block of East Roosevelt Avenue, which is located several blocks from Byrd's residence. Immediately thereafter, Szczerba radioed that he was in foot pursuit of the suspect. Shortly thereafter other officers joined Szczerba and observed him struggling on the ground with a suspect, later identified as Salasky. The other NCCPD officers indicated that Szczerba was giving them commands and warning them that he could not secure the suspect's arms. The officers noticed blood and Szczerba quickly stood up, walked away from the suspect, and announced: "I think I've been stabbed." Szczerba soon lost consciousness and collapsed. After Salasky was subdued and taken into police custody at the scene, both he and Szczerba were transported to Christiana Hospital. Szczerba died at the hospital and the Medical Examiner later determined that he had suffered multiple stab wounds to the neck, face, shoulder, back, and jugular. A 5-inch, fixed blade knife, which appeared to be covered in a reddish-brown substance visually consistent with blood, was recovered from the scene.
While at the hospital, a partially-consumed container of "bath salts, " which was packaged in a cylindrical container and labeled "XTREME, " fell from Salasky's pocket. Subsequent testing of both Salasky's blood and the container collected from the hospital revealed the presence of methylenedioxypyrovalerone ("MDPV"), a chemical compound that is often found in bath salts and has psychoactive effects. Salasky informed hospital personnel that he had recently been using bath salts, and his presentation of physical symptoms of tachycardia, renal failure, acidosis, and rhabdomyolysis were, according to his treating physicians, believed to be attributable to his ingestion of bath salts.
Over the course of the investigation, the police learned that Salasky was a frequent and heavy user of bath salts, particularly in the weeks leading up to September 16, 2011. During Salasky's recorded interviews with the NCCPD, he indicated that he had purchased and smoked bath salts during both the afternoon and evening hours of September 15, 2011. To corroborate this information, NCCPD secured a surveillance video that showed Salasky purchasing bath salts at a tobacco store, about four (4) hours prior to his arrest and approximately a half-mile away from the 300 block area of Penn Acres where he was taken into custody. Further, the NCCPD obtained video surveillance of the defendant's girlfriend, Hart, purchasing bath salts earlier that same day. Moreover, Hart informed the NCCPD that she and Salasky were smoking bath salts in Salasky's mother's backyard during the afternoon of September 15, 2011. Hart told the NCCPD that Salasky had discarded the pipe they used to smoke the bath salts that day into his mother's swimming pool and the NCCPD was able to recover this pipe from the pool. Subsequent analysis of the pipe's residue revealed the presence of MDPV.
Although Salasky denied committing the car burglaries and confronting Byrd during his interviews with NCCPD, he acknowledged his confrontation with Szczerba. Specifically, Salasky stated that he was aware Szczerba was a police officer, but that he stabbed Szczerba after he "grew fangs" and "turned into something else." Salasky informed NCCPD that he had previously been hospitalized at the Rockford Center, a private mental health facility. Additionally, Hart, family members, and others confirmed that Salasky had a history of both mental illness and drug use.
On September 16, 2011, police arrested Salasky on a warrant, which charged him with First Degree Murder and a related weapons offense. Salasky provided NCCPD detectives with statements on Friday, September 16, 2011 and Sunday, September 18, 2011.
On December 5, 2011, Salasky was indicted and charged with several offenses, which included three (3) counts of Murder First Degree, five (5) counts of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During Commission of a Felony, two (2) counts of Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited, one (1) count of Resisting Arrest, three (3) counts of Assault Second, one (1) count of Attempted Robbery First Degree, four (4) counts of Burglary Third Degree, four (4) counts of Theft, and one (1) count of Criminal Mischief.
On March 30, 2012, Salasky filed a Notice of Intent to Rely Upon a Mental Health Defense pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 12.2.
I. MOTION TO SUPPRESS SEARCHES
Salasky has moved to suppress any and all evidence, which was seized pursuant to search warrants for the following: 1) a 1999 green Ford Ranger; 2) a black Samsung phone; 3) Salasky's person; 4) 125 Lea Road, New Castle, Delaware; and 5) 1604 North Rodney Street, Apartment 3, Wilmington, Delaware. Specifically, Salasky claims that the search of the abovementioned locations violated his Fourth Amendment rights and, therefore, the State should be precluded at trial from using evidence seized from these locations. For the reasons set forth below, Salasky's Motion to Suppress is hereby denied.
After Salasky was taken into custody, Detective Clifton Vikara of the NCCPD applied for seven (7) search warrants. The affidavits in support of these warrants provided background facts as to the charged crimes as well as additional details specific to the locations sought to be searched. The warrant applications requested authorization to search the locations for various items, including the following: drugs; weapons; stolen goods; legal records; electronic data; samples of Salasky's DNA, hair, and fingernail clippings; the clothes Salasky wore when taken into custody; Salasky's medication and medical information; Salasky's writings; and keys to a Ford Ranger. All seven (7) warrants were approved by Magistrates of the Justice of the Peace, Court Number 11. Specifically, the following warrants are at issue here:
1. Dated September 16, 2011, for a 1999 green Ford Ranger, registered to David Salasky, Sr., Delaware registration CL23960 ("Search Warrant A");
2. Dated September 16, 2011, for a black, Samsung, flip-style cellular telephone ("Search Warrant B");
3. Dated September 16, 2011, for the body of Salasky ("Search Warrant C");
4. Dated September 16, 2011, for 125 Lea Road, New Castle, Delaware, residence of Salasky's mother ("Search Warrant D");
5. Dated September 16, 2011, for 1604 North Rodney Street, Apartment 3, Wilmington, Delaware, Salasky's residence ("Search Warrant E");
6. Dated September 20, 2011, for 125 Lea Road, New Castle, Delaware, residence of Salasky's mother ("Search Warrant F");
7. Dated September 20, 2011, for 1604 North Rodney Street, Apartment 3, Wilmington, Delaware, Salasky's residence ("Search Warrant G").
Standard of Review
On motions to suppress evidence presented to this Court, the defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged search or seizure violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Specifically, the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to relief. As the underlying search warrants were issued by a magistrate, this Court should give great deference to the magistrate's probable cause determination making only a substantial basis review to determine whether "the warrant was invalid because the magistrate's probable-cause determination reflected an improper analysis of the totality of the circumstances…." However, if "a logical nexus between the items sought and the place searched" exists, this Court should affirm the issuance.
A. Parties' Contentions
Salasky argues that the affidavits in support of the search warrants did not adequately establish a logical nexus between the evidence sought and the locations to be searched. As a result, Salasky contends the warrant should not have been approved by the magistrate and, thus, this Court should suppress any/all evidence gathered therefrom. Specifically, Salasky contends that the supporting affidavits of probable cause primarily focused on establishing that Salasky was the appropriate target of the police investigation regarding Szczerba's death, the attempted robbery at 19 Finney Road, and several car burglaries. Salasky claims that this was insufficient to warrant a broad search of Salasky's residences, vehicle, and electronic equipment. Stated alternatively, Salasky asserts that the warrants were defective because they failed to establish that the objects sought were: 1) seizable; and 2) likely to be found in the locations to be searched. Therefore, notwithstanding the substantial deference owed to issuing magistrates, Salasky concludes that this Court should suppress the evidence that was seized.
In response, the State first asserts that Salasky does not have standing to challenge Search Warrants A, D, or F, authorizing searches for the 1999 Ford Ranger and 125 Lea Road residence because Salasky was neither the registered owner of the vehicle nor resided at that address. As such, the State contends that Salasky does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle which was his fathers, or the address where his mother resides. The State further contends that even if Salasky does have standing, all of the search warrants were supported by the underlying affidavits relevant to the police's ongoing investigation of the murder of Szczerba and vehicular burglaries that had taken place earlier that evening.
Instead of reviewing the sufficiency of each individual search warrant, Salasky analyzes the validity of the supporting affidavits according to the seven categories of items sought by the various warrants. They include intoxicating substances; weapons; stolen goods; legal records; electronic data; medications and medical treatment records; and Salasky's writings. The Court can only surmise that this was done because there is significant consistency in the affidavits supporting each one and, thus, there is a repetitiveness in the arguments that Salasky desires to advance as to each warrant. However, the Court finds that in performing its function, the Court must consider each warrant separately and, therefore, it will consider the parties arguments as to each category as it relates to a specific warrant obtained by the police.
B. Standing/Probable Cause
As articulated in Hanna v. State,  this Court must engage in a "two-prong inquiry" when facing a motion to suppress evidence. First, this Court must determine if the movant has a right to contest the search or seizure: does he have standing. Second, "[o]nly when the movant has standing must the court assess the validity of the police conduct."
The United States Supreme Court in Rakas v. Illinois stated that:
Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted. A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed. And since the exclusionary rule is an attempt to effectuate the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment, it is proper to permit only defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated to benefit from the rule's protections.
Finding guidance in Rakas, the Delaware Supreme Court stated in Thomas v. State:
a proponent of a motion to suppress has standing to contest the legality of a search and seizure only if he can assert either a property or a possessory interest in the areas searched on the property seized and if he can show a legitimate expectation of privacy in the areas searched.
Therefore, the threshold inquiry to Salasky's Motion to Suppress is whether Salasky has standing to contest the searches. The State has brought standing challenges to Search Warrant A, the 1999 Ford Ranger, and Search Warrants D and F, both relating to the residence at 125 Lea Road.
In determining standing, this Court must determine whether the defendant had a reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy in the places to be searched. In Smith v. Maryland,  the United States Supreme Court articulated a two-prong test to evaluate whether a defendant enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched. "The first is whether the individual, by his conduct, has 'exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy'…. The second question is whether the individual's subjective expectation of privacy is 'one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable''" Accordingly, "[w]hen a defendant does not claim a possessory or proprietary interest in either the property searched or seized he is not entitled to challenge a search of the areas in which the property was located."
Using this standard, the Court will review the warrants issued for the 1999 Ford Ranger and the residence at 125 Lea Road.
(a) Ford Ranger
The 1999 Ford Ranger appears to be owned and registered to Salasky's father and Salasky has no ownership interest. Further, Salasky does not have his own keys to the vehicle and there were no keys to the vehicle found on Salasky's person when he was arrested. As Salasky states in this Motion, Salasky only had the ability to access keys to the vehicle when he was at the 125 Lea Road residence. Salasky admits that he had no ownership or possessory interest in the vehicle, and states that the vehicle was "merely possibly accessible to him." This case is clearly distinguishable from State v. Parker where, although the defendant did not own the searched vehicle, the vehicle was parked on their property, they possessed a key thereto, and they were currently borrowing the vehicle from the owner. Here, the vehicle was only periodically accessible to Salasky, he had no ownership interest in it, and it was simply his father's vehicle that he would borrow on occasion. Therefore, as Salasky has asserted no possessory or proprietary interest in the 1999 Ford Ranger, he cannot challenge the search thereof.
(b) Lea Road
Similarly, Salasky fails to establish standing to contest the search of the residence at 125 Lea Road. The Delaware Supreme Court has made a clear distinction between overnight guests in third party residences and casual or transient visitors at such residences. The former are found to have standing while the latter do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy within the residence.
Overnight guests are deemed to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the residences they are staying and, thus, are found to have standing to contest the searches thereof. The Delaware Supreme Court in Hanna v. State,  found that a frequent overnight guest who was arrested outside the residence had standing to contest to the search thereof. Similarly, in Nave v. State,  the defendant was found to have standing when the defendant had a key to the property and the express permission from the owner to stay overnight whenever they needed.
Conversely, in Washington v. State,  the Delaware Supreme Court denied a motion to suppress for lack of standing when the defendant did not reside at the property and offered no evidence of being an overnight guest there. Similarly, in Wilson v. State,  the defendant, although in the home alone with no shoes during the search, was found to be a casual guest and not an overnight guest in the residence. Thus, he did not have standing to contest to the search. Lastly, in Skyers v. State,  the defendant could not contest to the search of his friend's house where he had gone in the early morning to purchase illegal drugs and had fallen asleep on the couch watching television. The arrival in the early morning hours, coupled with the defendant's own testimony that he was stopping by before going home, categorized Skyers as an business invitee or casual and transient visitor rather than an overnight guest.
The 125 Lea Road property belongs to Salasky's mother and it is where Salasky's two children reside. Salasky does not own or reside at the property and, in fact, has his own apartment that was searched by the police. Although the property is listed as one of Salasky's addresses in DELJIS, the Court can only surmise that this is the address given by Salasky during a previous arrest. However, the listing of an address in a criminal database does not establish an interest in the property or an expectation of privacy at that location. Salasky was a frequent visitor at the Lea Road address simply because his mother and children resided there. There is nothing to suggest he regularly stayed overnight or maintained some reasonable privacy interest anywhere in the home. Salasky, therefore, has not exhibited any subjective expectation of privacy in the residence at 125 Lea Road, let alone one that society would find reasonable.
Accordingly, the Court finds Salasky lacks standing to challenge the searches of the 1999 Ford Ranger (Search Warrant A) and the 125 Lea Road residence (Search Warrants D, and F). Therefore, the remainder of this analysis relates only to the remaining Search Warrants B, C, E, and G.
2. Probable Cause
The United States and Delaware Constitutions protect the right of persons to be secure in their homes against "unreasonable searches and seizures." Searches and seizures are per se unreasonable, in the absence of exigent circumstances, unless authorized by a warrant supported by probable cause. The Delaware probable cause requirement has been codified in Title 11, Sections 2306 and 2307 of the Delaware Code, which set forth the requirements for the contents of an affidavit in support of a search warrant and the substantive and procedural requirements for a magistrate's issuance of a search warrant, respectively.
The Delaware Supreme Court has interpreted these two sections, read together, as being a "four-corners test for probable cause." This test requires that "sufficient facts  appear on the face of the affidavit so that a magistrate's personal knowledge notwithstanding, a reviewing Court can verify the existence of probable cause." Further, the affidavit, within the four-corners, must "set forth facts adequate for a judicial officer to form a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and the property to be seized will be found in a particular place." Therefore, the analysis is two-fold: first, whether there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed, and second, whether there is probable cause to believe evidence of the crime will be in the place sought to be searched. Each question must be answered by looking at the totality of the circumstances, considering the affidavit as a whole.
Title 11, Section 2305 of the Delaware Code provides that:
[a] warrant may authorize the search of any person, house, building, conveyance, place or other things for any of the following:
(1) Papers, articles or things of any kind which were instruments of or were used in a criminal offense, the escape therefrom or the concealment of said offense or offenses;
(2) Property obtained in the commission of a crime, whether the crime was committed by the owner or occupant of the house, building, place or conveyance to be searched or by another;
(3) Papers, articles, or things designed to be used for the commission of a crime and not reasonably calculated to be used for any other purpose;
(4) Papers, articles or things the possession of which is unlawful;
(5) Papers, articles or things which are of an evidentiary nature pertaining to the commission of a crime or crimes[.]
As previously mentioned, Salasky has challenged the magistrates probable cause determination as it relates to seven specific items for which the police requested to search: 1) intoxicating substances; 2) weapons; 3) other stolen goods; 4) legal records; 5) electronic data; 6) medication and medical treatment records; and 7) Salasky's writings. These challenges will be addressed as they relate to each specific warrant.
(a) 1604 N. Rodney Street (Search Warrant E)
Search Warrant E authorizes the search of Salasky's residence. The affidavit of Detective Bikara reflects that a DELJIS inquiry lists 1604 N. Rodney Street as the address of Salasky. The address was also confirmed by the Wilmington Police Department based upon a domestic dispute complaint they had responded to the day before the incident with Szczerba.
Salasky contends that the affidavits authorizing the search of this residence failed to establish probable cause as to why seizable property was likely to be found at this residence. Salasky challenges the warrant for 1604 N. Rodney Street insofar as it requested approval to search for:
. . .any suspected intoxicating substances, including, but not limited to, Xanax, "bath salts, " medication, whether or not prescription or otherwise, any an all illegal drugs, and the derivatives of any of the aforementioned intoxicating substances, the collection and processing of any and all small white plastic cylindrical container marked with "XTREME" and its contents, any and all medical treatment records, including those related to physical, mental, and/or emotional conditions, any documentation of the guilty plea agreement David Salasky reached with the State of Delaware on July 19, 2011 as well as the documentation of Mr. Salasky's sentence and ramifications of his felony guilty plea, any and all documentation from Probation and Parole regarding Mr. Salasky's conditions of probation including required treatment, curfew, or evaluation required, any and all deadly weapons as defined in 11 Delaware Code 222(5), including firearms, or similar weapon capable of firing a projectile, knives and/or cutting instruments of any sort, blackjacks and/or bludgeons and, metal knuckles, documentation of the possession, purchase, sale, trade, transfer, or storage of any such deadly weapons, items stolen in recent thefts from motor vehicles in the area including, a registration card in the name of a documented victim of a theft from motor vehicle on 08/30/11, Marlboro Light cigarettes, a set of "Blue Point" sockets, a set of "Matco" sockets, a "Matco" race driver set, a set of "Snap-On" sockets, a "Snap-On" cordless impact gun, a "Blue Point" power probe, and a "Blue Point" multi meter and the processing of any items collected for trace evidence documentation related to the planning, method, and/or motive of the crime of Murder 1st 11/636 F/A, used or intended to be used for Murder 1st 11/636 F/A is being concealed on the Person(s), Premise, Facility, or Computer system/Server described in the annexed affidavit and application or complaint.
Salasky's argument will be addressed as it relates to each category Salasky contends is unwarranted: 1) intoxicating substances; 2) weapons; 3) stolen goods; 4) legal records; and 5) medication and medical treatment records.
i. Intoxicating Substances
Salasky first asserts that "bath salts" containers marked "XTREME, " and Xanax did not constitute seizable contraband because: 1) "bath salts" were not illegal substances at the time the search was effectuated; 2) the containers marked "XTREME" were likely connected to "bath salts" and, for similar reasons, were not illegal substances; 3) there was no reason to believe the Xanax was acquired illegally; and 4) there was no allegation that these intoxicating substances were the items stolen from the burglarized cars. As such, Salasky maintains that because the intoxicating substances are neither contraband nor instrumentalities/fruits of a crime committed, the only other valid reason for the State's interest in seizing them must have been for evidentiary value. However, Salasky notes that the affidavits did not explain how the discovery of these intoxicating substances would have either advanced the investigation or assisted in Salasky's conviction. Instead, Salasky suggests that the true purpose of these search warrants was to assist in Salasky's conviction by establishing a pattern of drug abuse, thereby preempting a possible affirmative defense. Therefore, Salasky contends that the affidavits failed to establish probable cause that the intoxicating substances, regardless of their legality, constituted seizable property that would be found at the locations to be searched.
Conversely, the State argues that the police were seeking all medications and drugs, regardless of their legality, to which Salasky had access in order to determine the effect, if any, they could have had on his behavior. As such, the State asserts that this constituted a legitimate purpose, which would have assisted in the police investigation into Salasky's state of mind and activity on September 16, 2011.
When taken to the hospital, Salasky admitted to medical personnel that he had taken Xanax and ingested bath salts earlier that evening. Bath salts were also found on Salasky's person when he was arrested, further corroborating his statements. Relatives of Salasky also disclosed to law enforcement that he was being treated and had been prescribed medication for a bipolar condition and stomach pain. That information coupled with Salasky's conduct that evening, which was bizarre and extremely violent, leads to a fair inference that this medication or a combination thereof caused the conduct that led to the killing of Szczerba. Since only a limited amount of bath salts were actually found on Salasky, it is logical and reasonable to also infer that additional drugs or residue/remainder of the drugs taken by Salasky would be at Salasky's residence at 1604 N. Rodney Street. The facts detailed above were contained in the affidavit and supported the conclusion that intoxicating substances were relevant as they perhaps contributed to the crimes and might be found in his residence.
Salasky's reliance on State v. Cannon is misplaced. This Court, in Cannon, determined there was an insufficient nexus between the alleged crime and the location to searched when:
(1) the tips came from unproven citizen informants; (2) no one suggested Cannon was using his residence for drug dealing; (3) the police never conducted a controlled buy; (4) 0.1 grams of cocaine [did] not support an allegation that Cannon was selling large amounts of drugs; and (5) the police never observed Cannon leaving or returning to his residence with anything that looked related to drug dealing.
This Court in State v. Holton further clarified Cannon's holding as follows:
Based on the Court's analysis in Cannon, there was no probable cause to believe that Cannon was selling large quantities of drugs—a crime that would justify a reasonable belief that an individual is hiding evidence or contraband in his home. To put it another way, the police in Cannon had no probable cause to suspect Cannon's involvement in the crime for which he was investigated. Logically, this means the police had no probable cause to search Cannon's home for evidence of that crime.
This same premise is not true here. As ruled by the Supreme Court in State v. Jones "although probable cause to arrest does not automatically provide probable cause to search the arrestee's home, the fact that probable cause to arrest has been established increases the probability that the defendant is storing evidence of that crime in the defendant's residence." The investigation being conducted by the police on the night of this incident clearly supports this conclusion.
The police here had direct knowledge that a crime was committed involving intoxicating substances. Salasky had advised medical personnel that he had ingested bath salts and Xanax prior to the incident and bath salts had been found on Salasky's person. Further, the police had information of Salasky's underlying medical and mental conditions, which were potentially attributable to the alleged crimes, and knew that Salasky, in the past, had taken medication for these conditions. Therefore, because of the nature of the crime and the involvement of intoxicating substances that likely contributed to that ...