Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Before the Colorado Republican Party selected its 1986 senatorial candidate, its Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado Party), the petitioner here, bought radio advertisements attacking the Democratic Party's likely candidate. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) brought suit charging that the Colorado Party had violated the "Party Expenditure Provision" of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), 2 U. S. C. Section(s) 441a(d)(3), which imposes dollar limits upon political party "expenditure[s] in connection with the general election campaign of a [congressional] candidate." The Colorado Party defended in part by claiming that the expenditure limitations violated the First Amendment as applied to its advertisements, and filed a counterclaim seeking to raise a facial challenge to the Provision as a whole. The District Court interpreted the ``in connection with'' language narrowly and held that the Provision did not cover the expenditure at issue. It therefore entered summary judgment for the Colorado Party, dismissing the counterclaim as moot. In ordering judgment for the FEC, the Court of Appeals adopted a somewhat broader interpretation of the Provision, which, it said, both covered this expenditure and satisfied the Constitution.
Held: The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Justice Breyer announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter join.
In April 1986, before the Colorado Republican Party had selected its senatorial candidate for the fall's election, that Party's Federal Campaign Committee bought radio advertisements attacking Timothy Wirth, the Democratic Party's likely candidate. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) charged that this "expenditure" exceeded the dollar limits that a provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) imposes upon political party "expenditure[s] in connection with" a "general election campaign" for congressional office. 90 Stat. 486, as amended, 2 U. S. C. Section(s) 441a(d)(3). This case focuses upon the constitutionality of those limits as applied to this case. We conclude that the First Amendment prohibits the application of this provision to the kind of expenditure at issue here-an expenditure that the political party has made independently, without coordination with any candidate.
To understand the issues and our holding, one must begin with FECA as it emerged from Congress in 1974. That Act sought both to remedy the appearance of a "corrupt" political process (one in which large contributions seem to buy legislative votes) and to level the electoral playing field by reducing campaign costs. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25-27 (1976) (per curiam). It consequently imposed limits upon the amounts that individuals, corporations, "political committees" (such as political action committees, or PAC's), and political parties could contribute to candidates for federal office, and it also imposed limits upon the amounts that candidates, corporations, labor unions, political committees, and political parties could spend, even on their own, to help a candidate win election. See 18 U. S. C. Section(s) 608, 610 (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
This Court subsequently examined several of the Act's provisions in light of the First Amendment's free speech and association protections. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238 (1986); Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480 (1985) (NCPAC); California Medical Assn. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U. S. 182 (1981); Buckley, supra. In these cases, the Court essentially weighed the First Amendment interest in permitting candidates (and their supporters) to spend money to advance their political views, against a "compelling" governmental interest in assuring the electoral system's legitimacy, protecting it from the appearance and reality of corruption. See Massachusetts Citizens for Life, supra, at 256-263; NCPAC, supra, at 493-501; California Medical Assn., supra, at 193-199; Buckley, supra, at 14-23. After doing so, the Court found that the First Amendment prohibited some of FECA's provisions, but permitted others.
Most of the provisions this Court found unconstitutional imposed expenditure limits. Those provisions limited candidates' rights to spend their own money, Buckley, supra, at 51-54, limited a candidate's campaign expenditures, 424 U. S., at 54-58, limited the right of individuals to make "independent" expenditures (not coordinated with the candidate or candidate's campaign), id., at 39-51, and similarly limited the right of political committees to make "independent" expenditures, NCPAC, supra, at 497. The provisions that the Court found constitutional mostly imposed contribution limits-limits that apply both when an individual or political committee contributes money directly to a candidate and also when they indirectly contribute by making expenditures that they coordinate with the candidate, Section(s) 441a(a)(7)(B)(i). See Buckley, supra, at 23-36. See also 424 U. S., at 46-48; California Medical Assn., supra, at 193-199 (limits on contributions to political committees). Consequently, for present purposes, the Act now prohibits individuals and political committees from making direct, or indirect, contributions that exceed the following limits:
(a) For any "person": $1,000 to a candidate "with respect to any election"; $5,000 to any political committee in any year; $20,000 to the national committees of a political party in any year; but all within an overall limit (for any individual in any year) of $25,000. 2 U. S. C. Section(s) 441a(a)(1), (3).
(b) For any "multicandidate political committee": $5,000 to a candidate "with respect to any election"; $5,000 to any political committee in any year; and $15,000 to the national committees of a political party in any year. Section(s) 441a(a)(2).
FECA also has a special provision, directly at issue in this case, that governs contributions and expenditures by political parties. Section(s) 441a(d). This special provision creates, in part, an exception to the above contribution limits. That is, without special treatment, political parties ordinarily would be subject to the general limitation on contributions by a "multicandidate political committee" just described. See Section(s) 441a(a)(4). That provision, as we said in (b) above, limits annual contributions by a "multicandidate political committee" to no more than $5,000 to any candidate. And as also mentioned above, this contribution limit governs not only direct contributions but also indirect contributions that take the form of coordinated expenditures, defined as "expenditures made . . . in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents." Section(s) 441a(a)(7)(B)(i). Thus, ordinarily, a party's coordinated expenditures would be subject to the $5,000 limitation.
However, FECA's special provision, which we shall call the "Party Expenditure Provision," creates a general exception from this contribution limitation, and from any other limitation on expenditures. It says:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law with respect to limitations on expenditures or limitations on contributions, . . . political party [committees] . . . may make expenditures in connection with the general election campaign of candidates for Federal office . . ." Section(s) 441a(d)(1) (emphasis added).
After exempting political parties from the general contribution and expenditure limitations of the statute, the Party Expenditure Provision then imposes a substitute limitation upon party "expenditures" in a senatorial campaign equal to the greater of $20,000 or "2 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the State," Section(s) 441a(d)(3)(A)(i), adjusted for inflation since 1974, Section(s) 441a(c). The Provision permitted a political party in Colorado in 1986 to spend about $103,000 in connection with the general election campaign of a candidate for the United States Senate. See FEC Record, vol. 12, no. 4, p. 1 (Apr. 1986). (A different provision, not at issue in this case, Section(s) 441a(d)(2), limits party expenditures in connection with presidential campaigns. Since this case involves only the provision concerning congressional races, we do not address issues that might grow out of the public funding of Presidential campaigns).
In January 1986, Timothy Wirth, then a Democratic Congressman, announced that he would run for an open Senate seat in November. In April, before either the Democratic primary or the Republican convention, the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado Party), the petitioner here, bought radio advertisements attacking Congressman Wirth. The State Democratic Party complained to the Federal Election Commission. It pointed out that the Colorado Party had previously assigned its $103,000 general election allotment to the National Republican Senatorial Committee, leaving it without any permissible spending balance. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U. S. 27 (1981) (state party may appoint national senatorial campaign committee as agent to spend its Party Expenditure Provision allotment). It argued that the purchase of radio time was an "expenditure in connection with the general election campaign of a candidate for Federal office," Section(s) 441a(d)(3), which, consequently, exceeded the Party Expenditure Provision limits.
The FEC agreed with the Democratic Party. It brought a complaint against the Colorado Republican Party, charging a violation. The Colorado Party defended in part by claiming that the Party Expenditure Provision's expenditure limitations violated the First Amendment-a charge that it repeated in a counterclaim that said the Colorado Party intended to make other "expenditures directly in connection with" senatorial elections, App. 68, Para(s) 48, and attacked the constitutionality of the entire Party Expenditure Provision. The Federal District Court interpreted the Provision's words "`in connection with' the general election campaign of a candidate" narrowly, as meaning only expenditures for advertising using "`express words of advocacy of election or defeat.'" 839 F. Supp. 1448, 1455 (Colo. 1993) (quoting Buckley, 424 U. S., at 46, n. 52). See also Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U. S., at 249. As so interpreted, the court held, the provision did not cover the expenditures here. The court entered summary judgment for the Colorado Party and dismissed its counterclaim as moot.
Both sides appealed. The Government, for the FEC, argued for a somewhat broader interpretation of the statute-applying the limits to advertisements containing an "electioneering message" about a "clearly identified candidate," FEC Advisory Op. 1985-14, 2 CCH Fed. Election Camp. Fin. Guide Para(s) 5819, p. 11,185 (May 30, 1985) (AO 1985-14)-which, it said, both covered the expenditure and satisfied the Constitution. The Court of Appeals agreed. It found the Party Expenditure Provision applicable, held it constitutional, and ordered judgment in the FEC's favor. 59 F. 3d 1015, 1023-1024 (CA10 1995).
We granted certiorari primarily to consider the Colorado Party's argument that the Party Expenditure Provision violates the First Amendment "either facially or as applied." Pet. for Cert. i. For reasons we shall discuss in Part IV below, we consider only the latter question-whether the Party Expenditure Provision as applied here violates the First Amendment. We conclude that it does.
The summary judgment record indicates that the expenditure in question is what this Court in Buckley called an "independent" expenditure, not a "coordinated" expenditure that other provisions of FECA treat as a kind of campaign "contribution." See Buckley, supra, at 36-37, 46-47, 78; NCPAC, 470 U. S., at 498. The record describes how the expenditure was made. In a deposition, the Colorado Party's Chairman, Howard Callaway, pointed out that, at the time of the expenditure, the Party had not yet selected a senatorial nominee from among the three individuals vying for the nomination. App. 195-196. He added that he arranged for the development of the script at his own initiative, id., at 200, that he, and no one else, approved it, id., at 199, that the only other politically relevant individuals who might have read it were the party's executive director and political director, ibid., and that all relevant discussions took place at meetings attended only by party staff, id., at 204.
Notwithstanding the above testimony, the Government argued in District Court-and reiterates in passing in its brief to this Court, Brief for Respondent 27, n. 20-that the deposition showed that the Party had coordinated the advertisement with its candidates. It pointed to Callaway's statement that it was the practice of the party to "coordinat[e] with the candidate" "campaign strategy," App. 195, and for Callaway to be "as involved as [he] could be" with the individuals seeking the Republican nomination, ibid., by making available to them "all of the assets of the party," id., at 195-196. These latter statements, however, are general descriptions of party practice. They do not refer to the advertising campaign at issue here or to its preparation. Nor do they conflict with, or cast significant doubt upon, the uncontroverted direct evidence that this advertising campaign was developed by the Colorado Party independently and not pursuant to any general or particu-lar understanding with a candidate. We can find no "genuine" issue of fact in this respect. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574, 586-587 (1986). And we therefore treat the expenditure, for constitutional purposes, as an "independent" expenditure, not an indirect campaign contribution.
So treated, the expenditure falls within the scope of the Court's precedents that extend First Amendment protection to independent expenditures. Beginning with Buckley, the Court's cases have found a "fundamental constitutional difference between money spent to advertise one's views independently of the candidate's campaign and money contributed to the candidate to be spent on his campaign." NCPAC, supra, at 497. This difference has been grounded in the observation that restrictions on contributions impose "only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication," Buckley, supra, at 20-21, because the symbolic communicative value of a contribution bears little relation to its size, 424 U. S., at 21, and because such limits leave "persons free to engage in independent political expression, to associate actively through volunteering their services, and to assist to a limited but nonetheless substantial extent in supporting candidates and committees with financial resources." Id., at 28. At the same time, reasonable contribution limits directly and materially advance the Government's interest in preventing exchanges of large financial contributions for political favors. Id., at 26-27.
In contrast, the Court has said that restrictions on independent expenditures significantly impair the ability of individuals and groups to engage in direct political advocacy and "represent substantial . . . restraints on the quantity and diversity of political speech." Id., at 19. And at the same time, the Court has concluded that limitations on independent expenditures are less directly related to preventing corruption, since "[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate . . . not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate." Id., at 47.
Given these established principles, we do not see how a provision that limits a political party's independent expenditures can escape their controlling effect. A political party's independent expression not only reflects its members' views about the philosophical and governmental matters that bind them together, it also seeks to convince others to join those members in a practical democratic task, the task of creating a government that voters can instruct and hold responsible for subsequent success or failure. The independent expression of a political party's views is "core" First Amendment activity no less than is the independent expression of individuals, candidates, or other political committees. See, e.g., Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U. S. 214 (1989).
We are not aware of any special dangers of corruption associated with political parties that tip the constitutional balance in a different direction. When this Court considered, and held unconstitutional, limits that FECA had set on certain independent expenditures by political action committees, it reiterated Buckley's observation that "the absence of prearrangement and coordination" does not eliminate, but it does help to "alleviate," any "danger" that a candidate will understand the expenditure as an effort to obtain a "quid pro quo." See NCPAC, 470 U. S., at 498. The same is true of independent party expenditures.
We recognize that FECA permits individuals to contribute more money ($20,000) to a party than to a candidate ($1,000) or to other political committees ($5,000). 2 U. S. C. Section(s) 441a(a). We also recognize that FECA permits unregulated "soft money" contributions to a party for certain activities, such as electing candidates for state office, see Section(s) 431(8)(A)(i), or for voter registration and "get out the vote" drives, see Section(s) 431(8)(B)(xii). But the opportunity for corruption posed by these greater opportunities for contributions is, at best, attenuated. Unregulated "soft money" contributions may not be used to influence a federal campaign, except when used in the limited, party-building activities specifically designated in the statute. See Section(s) 431(8)(B). Any contribution to a party that is earmarked for a particular campaign, is considered a contribution to the candidate and is subject to the contribution limitations. Section(s) 441a(a)(8). A party may not simply channel unlimited amounts of even undesignated contributions to a candidate, since such direct transfers are also considered contributions and are subject to the contribution limits on a "multicandidate political committee." Section(s) 441a(a)(2). The greatest danger of corruption, therefore, appears to be from the ability of donors to give sums up to $20,000 to a party which may be used for independent party expenditures for the benefit of a particular candidate. We could understand how Congress, were it to conclude that the potential for evasion of the individual contribution limits was a serious matter, might decide to change the statute's limitations on contributions to political parties. Cf. California Medical Assn., 453 U. S., at 197-199 (plurality opinion) (danger of evasion of limits on contribution to candidates justified prophylactic limitation on contributions to PAC's). But we do not believe that the risk of corruption present here could justify the "markedly greater burden on basic freedoms caused by" the statute's limitations on expenditures. Buckley, supra, at 44. See also 424 U. S., at 46-47, 51; NCPAC, supra, at 498. Contributors seeking to avoid the effect of the $1,000 contribution limit indirectly by donations to the national party could spend that same amount of money (or more) themselves more directly by making their own independent expenditures promoting the candidate. See Buckley, supra, at 44-48 (risk of corruption by individuals' independent expenditures is insufficient to justify limits on such spending). If anything, an independent expenditure made possible by a $20,000 donation, but controlled and directed by a party rather than the donor, would seem less likely to corrupt than the same (or a much larger) independent expenditure made directly by that donor. In any case, the constitutionally significant fact, present equally in both instances, is the lack of coordination between the candidate and the source of the expenditure. See Buckley, supra, at 45-46; NCPAC, supra, at 498. This fact prevents us from assuming, absent convincing evidence to the contrary, that a limitation on political parties' independent expenditures is necessary to combat a substantial danger of corruption of the electoral system.
The Government does not point to record evidence or legislative findings suggesting any special corruption problem in respect to independent party expenditures. See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. ___, ___ (1994) (slip. op., at 40-41) ("When the Government defends a regulation on speech as a means to . . . prevent anticipated harms, it must do more than simply posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); NCPAC, supra, at 498. To the contrary, this Court's opinions suggest that Congress wrote the Party Expenditure Provision not so much because of a special concern about the potentially "corrupting" effect of party expenditures, but rather for the constitutionally insufficient purpose of reducing what it saw as wasteful and excessive campaign spending. See Buckley, supra, at 57. In fact, rather than indicating a special fear of the corruptive influence of political parties, the legislative history demonstrates Congress' general desire to enhance what was seen as an important and legitimate role for political parties in American elections. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U. S., at 41 (Party Expenditure Provision was intended to ...