Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, D.C. Civil No. 88-5041.
Higginbotham, Cowen, and Aldisert, Circuit Judges.
The appellants are five Philadelphia residents and taxpayers. They are not now, nor will they in the future be, involved in the construction business. They have appealed from a district court judgment dismissing their complaint against the city and its officials for lack of standing. The complaint asserted an equal protection violation resulting from the application of minority business enterprise participation requirements ("MBE") to a city construction project. The question for decision is whether, as contended, the appellants have standing to assert this equal protection claim based upon their status as residents and taxpayers. They rely on the teachings of Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 56 U.S.L.W. 4818, 101 L. Ed. 2d 520, 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988) and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 20 L. Ed. 2d 947, 88 S. Ct. 1942 (1968). We agree with the district court and will affirm.
Jurisdiction was proper in the trial court based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Jurisdiction on appeal is proper based on 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Appeal was timely filed under Rule 4(a), Fed. R. App. P.
The court is reviewing the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P. The applicable standard of review requires the court to accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 759 F.2d 271, 273 (3d Cir. 1985); Rogin v. Bensalem Twp., 616 F.2d 680, 685 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom., Mark-Garner Assocs., Inc. v. Bensalem Twp., 450 U.S. 1029, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1981); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90, 94 S. Ct. 1683 (1974).
In February of 1988, the City of Philadelphia issued invitations to bid on a portion of the construction of the Criminal Justice Center. The bid specifications required 15% minority owned business enterprise participation and 10% female owned business enterprise participation. App. at 52. On March 4, 1988, the Department of Public Property issued Addendum No. 1, giving notice to all prospective bidders that, for this project, the required minority business enterprise participation was increased to 35%, and "at least 45% of the employment hours for the work performed on-site for this bid package shall be performed by qualified minority and female workers, made up of 35% minority and 10% female." App. at 53; see Philadelphia Code, ch. 17-500 to 504 (giving the City of Philadelphia discretion to set minority business enterprise participation requirements).
Addendum No. 1 was circulated to potential contractors. There is no evidence in the record that any objections were raised by the appellants or by any potential contractor at any time prior to bid opening. Three bids were submitted and the city announced the project would be awarded to Cornell/Coastal Steel. It was at this time that appellants filed a complaint in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. The case was then removed to the federal district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
In the complaint, Rocks, and the other plaintiffs claimed that: (1) the increased minority participation requirements were violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution; (2) the increased requirements violated the constitutional guarantee of substantive due process; (3) as a matter of state law, the mayor and the city agencies lacked the power to increase the minority business enterprise participation requirements; and (4) the agency proceeding to increase minority participation did not comply with the procedural requirements of state law.
The district court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the MBEs on equal protection grounds. The court acknowledged that Rocks and the other plaintiffs possessed what has been described as article III or "pure" standing. App. at 125. However, the court found that the nonconstitutional, prudential limitations on standing had not been satisfied. App. at 126; see Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 471, 70 L. Ed. 2d 700, 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72-82, 57 L. Ed. 2d 595, 98 S. Ct. 2620 (1978); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112, 49 L. Ed. 2d 826, 96 S. Ct. 2868 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 495, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975). The court stated that the appellants were "attempting to raise the equal protection rights of non-minority businessowners and workers with whom they have no special relationship." App. at 126.
The district court also found that appellants failed to state a claim for violation of substantive due process. App. at 131-33. Relying on Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Twp., 808 F.2d 1023 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906, 107 S. Ct. 2482, 96 L. Ed. 2d 375 (1987), the court held that plaintiffs had not met the pleading requirements necessary to pursue such a claim. See Rogin, 616 F.2d at 689 (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88, 99 L. Ed. 563, 75 S. Ct. 461 (1955)). The court said that the complaint raised conclusory allegations only, and that without more, the complaint did not qualify as a substantive due process attack. App. at 132. Appellants have not challenged this ruling before us. Having ...