Wright, Mikva and Bork, Circuit Judges.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge MIKVA.
DECISION OF THE COURT DELIVERED BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE MIKVA
We hold that appellant has clearly raised a viable claimn for relief and that dismissal pursuant to § 1915 was not warranted. We, therefore, grant the appellant's motion for summary reversal and remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Sills is an inmate in the federal correctional institution at Texarkana, Texas. Mr. Sills was convicted by courts-martial and thereafter transferred into the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons pursuant to Article 58(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 858(a)(1982). On November 23, 1984, appellant, through counsel, filed a complaint in the District Court seeking an order directing the Bureau of Prisons to allow Mr. Sills, and all other similarly situated prisoners, access to current military legal materials. Appellant alleged that the military law materials at the facility in Texarkana are insufficient to guarantee his constitutional right to meaningful access to the courts. The complaint includes three causes of action: one based on the constitutional right of meaningful access to the courts, one based on the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and one based on the regulations of the Bureau of Prisons. Upon receipt of the complaint, the District Court, sua sponte, and prior to service of process of the defendant, dismissed Mr. Sills' complaint. No further explanation, other than the cryptic notation on the face of the complaint, was given by the District Court. II. ANALYSIS
Although a party bears a heavy burden of showing that summary disposition is appropriate, see United States v. Allen, 133 U.S. App. D.C. 84, 408 F.2d 1287, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam), we find that Mr. Sills has clearly met that burden in this case. There is nothing that could be brought before this court by the appellee which could affect the need to order the complaint reinstated. Because the merits of Mr. Sills' right to proceed are so clear, plenary briefing, oral argument, and the traditional collegiality of the decisional process would not affect our decision. In sum, the merits of this action has been given the fullest consideration necessary to a just determination; accordingly, summary disposition is appropriate. See Walker v. Washington, 201 U.S. App. D.C. 82, 627 F.2d 541, 545 (D.C. Cir.)(per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994, 66 L. Ed. 2d 292, 101 S. Ct. 532 (1980); see also Ambach v. Bell, 222 U.S. App. D.C. 348, 686 F.2d 974, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1982)(per curiam).
A. Dismissal Pursuant to § 1915(d)
"To guarantee that no citizen shall be denied an opportunity to commence, prosecute, or defend an action . . . in any court . . . solely because his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the costs," Adkins v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342, 93 L. Ed. 43, 69 S. Ct. 85 (1948), Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits federal courts to authorize the maintenance of an action without prepayment of fees and costs. At the same time, Congress enacted a "narrow exception," see Brandon v. District of Columbia Board of Parole, 236 U.S. App. D.C. 155, 734 F.2d 56, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1127, 105 S. Ct. 811, 83 L. Ed. 2d 804 (1985), to this right by authorizing a court to dismiss such an action if it is "satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)(1982).
This court has recognized the serious impact of threshold dismissal on the rights of indigent litigants and has repeatedly attempted to protect these rights by providing clear guidelines and procedures which must be followed before a litigant is denied his right to seek redress in the courts. We have consistently held that § 1915(d) may not be utilized to "shortcircuit," see Brandon, 734 F.2d at 59, the claims of litigants who, had they not been indigent, would have been permitted to continue with the action. We have admonished the district court that § 1915(d) "provides no basis for cursory treatment of meritorious complaints" and further that the discretion to dismiss "may not be exercised arbitrarily and is limited . . . in every case by the language of the statute itself which restricts its application to complaints found to be frivolous or malicious." Brandon, 734 F.2d at 58-59; Crisafi v. Holland, 211 U.S. App. D.C. 75, 655 F.2d 1305, 1306-1307 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citations omitted).
The court has also clearly defined the narrow class of cases which may be deemed "frivolous." If a complaint "indicate[s] facts in support of its conclusions," see Crisafi, 655 F.2d at 1307, and the named defendant is amenable to suit, see id. at 1308, then "if the complaint has at least an arguable basis in law and fact . . . it cannot be deemed frivolous. . . . Dismissal of . . . suits under the frivolous standard must therefore be reserved for those cases in which there is indisputably absent any factual and legal basis for the asserted wrong." Brandon, 734 F.2d at 59 (emphasis in original). We have repeatedly sought to emphasize the limited nature of this exception by noting that "sua sponte dismissal would almost always seem less preferable than requiring at least some responsive answer from the government entity or official named as defendant." Brandon, 734 F.2d at 62; Redwood v. Council of the District of Columbia, 220 U.S. App. D.C. 113, 679 F.2d 931, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Finally, to fulfill our duty as a court of appeals, and to ensure that the indigent litigant's rights have been considered, we have asked the district court to provide a clear statement of reasons when dismissing a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). The statement serves two purposes: it facilitates appellate review by informing this court and the parties of the grounds on which the action was dismissed, and, "more importantly," it ensures that the district court has carefully considered the complaint and the applicable law. In re Pope, 188 U.S. App. D.C. 357, 580 F.2d 620, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also Norris V. Slothouber, 231 U.S. App. D.C. 78, 718 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1983); In re Scott, 228 U.S. App. D.C. 278, 709 F.2d 717, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Redwood, 679 F.2d at 934; Crisafi, 655 F.2d at 1310. Mere notations on the face of the complaint do not serve either of these purposes. "Such a practice encourages frequently unmeritorious appeals; it may needlessly consume the time of litigants, the court of appeals, and ultimately the district court as well." Redwood, 679 F.2d at 934; see also Crisafi, 655 F.2d at 1310.
This mandate would be unnecessary if the district court exercised its power to revoke in forma pauperis status on appeal when dismissing a case as frivolous under § 1915(d). Section 1915(a) states that "an appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith." "In the absence of some evident improper motive, the applicant's good faith is established by the presentation of any issue that is not plainly frivolous." Ellis v. United Stes, 356 U.S. 674, 674, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1060, 78 S. Ct. 974 (1978). Therefore, if the district court dismisses a case as frivolous, then it should also revoke in forma pauperis status, or it should explain why the action is "frivolous" in the district court, but is not "frivolous" on appeal. If the district court denies a motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis, it "shall state in writing the reasons for the denial." Fed. R. App. P. 24(a). This court has held that the required statement of reasons must present more than simple conclusions:
If the denial of leave to appeal is because appellant cannot be deemed in good faith because his claim is frivolous, the statement of reasons should explain why the claim is frivolous. If the finding rests on considerations of fact, appropriate record citations might be given. If it rests on a ...